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INTRODUCTION 
The United States causes significant damage to its residents through its 
excessive use of incarceration, the burden of which falls particularly heavily 
on Black, Indigenous, and People of Color (BIPOC) communities. Today, 
2.3 million people are incarcerated in the nation’s prisons and jails, and the 
country leads the world in its rate of incarceration. However, over the last 15 
years, states and the federal government invested significant resources in 
legislative measures aiming to lower this astronomical incarceration rate. 
Since 2007, at least thirty-five states have passed legislative reforms 
targeting their sentencing and corrections policies with assistance through the 
Justice Reinvestment Initiative. This public-private partnership includes the 
U.S. Justice Department’s Bureau of Justice Assistance, The Pew Charitable 
Trusts, the Council of State Governments Justice Center, the Crime and 
Justice Institute, and other organizations.1 These efforts have been driven, at 
least in part, by a recognition that mass incarceration has significant negative 
impacts on society, including injuries to liberty, medical and mental health, 
education, family unity, and taxpayers.2 These efforts have also been driven 
by a belief that prisons incarcerate people who should not be incarcerated, 
either by incarcerating people whose incarceration was not required or 
incarcerating people for too long. 
Courts have not been sufficiently active participants in such reforms 
because they have left one valuable tool in the toolbox unused—the 
retroactivity of new rules to past convictions. Historically, rules of law were 
applied to conduct or activities that occurred in the past.3 However, now 
 
 1 COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, Justice Reinvestment: Reinvest in What Works, 
https://csgjusticecenter.org/projects/justice-reinvestment [https://perma.cc/D9WF-3CDN] 
(last visited July 16, 2020); PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, PUBLIC SAFETY PERFORMANCE 
PROJECT, https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/projects/public-safety-performance-project/about 
[https://perma.cc/48PH-T4R5] (last accessed August 5, 2020). 
 2 COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, JUSTICE REINVESTMENT: REINVEST IN WHAT WORKS, 
https://csgjusticecenter.org/projects/justice-reinvestment/ [https://perma.cc/D9WF-3CDN] 
(last accessed August 5, 2020); NANCY LA VIGNE, URBAN INST., JUSTICE REINVESTMENT 
INITIATIVE: EXPERIENCES FROM THE STATES 1–5 (2013). 
 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND IN FOUR BOOKS, VOL. 
1, 69 (15th ed. 1809); see Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971); Allen v. State 
Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 572 (1969); Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Mach., 392 U.S. 
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when an appellate court announces a rule that it considers “new,” federal 
courts use the Teague test—set out by the United States Supreme Court in 
1989—to decide whether to invalidate final convictions.4 The narrow 
exceptions under Teague are notoriously stringent, denying any relief to 
many who are incarcerated because of convictions subsequently found to 
have been obtained in violation of the Constitution. Although the Supreme 
Court set forth this strict test, it subsequently made clear in Danforth v. 
Minnesota that Teague provides a floor and not a ceiling, such that states can 
choose to put in place their own tests to balance the interests of their states.5 
As a result, the injuries caused by incarceration have become clearer and state 
specific, and the desire to remedy these harms has become overwhelming.6 
It is therefore time to rethink some of the rationales that limit the application 
of criminal appellate decisions in ways that keep people with final 
convictions from obtaining relief. 
This article argues that state courts should examine their states’ interest 
in reforming mass incarceration and revive the courts’ historical authority to 
more liberally make appellate decisions retroactive—in particular, decisions 
that establish constitutional defects in criminal trials. This liberal 
retroactivity power can create a mechanism for people incarcerated contrary 
to the Constitution to return home to their communities. Doing so will help 
lessen the country’s reliance on prisons, undo the harm resulting from 
unconstitutional sentences courts were complicit in enforcing, and make the 
system the courts uphold a more honest mechanism of justice. To 
demonstrate the importance and possible application of this shift, this article 
will examine retroactivity in the context of a vestige of Louisiana’s racist 
criminal system: non-unanimous juries. 
I. THE ROAD TO MODERN RETROACTIVITY 
Credit must be given to the many who have grappled with the long and 
winding history of retroactivity in the United States courts. The history of 
retroactivity jurisprudence has been thoroughly covered by previous 
 
481, 496 (1968); Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13, 25 (1964) (collectively 
holding that there are some narrow circumstances in which the equities may justify non-
retroactivity). 
 4 See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1259 
(2016). 
 5 Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 266 (2008). 
 6 Id. 
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scholars.7 This article makes only brief reference to that history to 
contextualize the argument that state courts must proactively reclaim their 
power to declare new rules retroactive. 
Under English law, in which the United States judicial system claims its 
roots, all judicial decisions were retroactive.8 Such an approach made sense. 
As originally conceived, courts did not make new law, they merely declared 
what was existing law. As such, “new” declarations applied to everyone, 
even if the case was final.9 It was not the law that changed, but rather our 
understanding of the law.  
The birth of non-retroactivity as a rule is a relatively recent 
phenomenon. The rule began as an effort to clamp down on inter-system 
review of state convictions by federal courts. It was further propelled by 
states’ intense negative reactions to incorporating the Bill of Rights, and was 
eventually solidified in the effort to curtail the effects of the newly announced 
exclusionary rule.10 After grappling with the formulation of the rule for many 
years, Teague was born, declaring that a new rule would not retroactively 
apply to final convictions unless it fell into one of two narrowly defined 
categories:11 substantive constitutional rules,12 or watershed rules of criminal 
procedure.13 The change from retroactive application to nearly complete 
prospective application is best conceptualized as a policy decision aimed at 
protecting state convictions from federal review, no matter how much a state 
conviction offended the federal Constitution.  In striking what others have 
 
 7 See Christopher N. Lasch, The Future of Teague Retroactivity, Or “Redressability,” 
After Danforth v. Minnesota: Why Lower Courts Should Give Retroactive Effect to New 
Constitutional Rules of Criminal Procedure in Postconviction Proceedings, 46 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1, 6 n.18 (2009) (collecting articles) for a full history of retroactivity jurisprudence. 
 8 Id. at 10–11; Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) (“Judicial decisions have had retrospective operation for nearly a thousand 
years.”). Retroactivity, as used in this Article, refers to the application of a ruling by an 
appellate court regarding a defect in a conviction to allow people with final convictions to 
obtain either a new trial or a resentencing because those people share the same defect. 
 9 See Christopher M. Smith, Schriro v. Summerlin: A Fatal Accident of Timing, 54 
DEPAUL L. REV. 1325, 1328 (2005). 
 10 See Lasch, supra note 7, at 3–5 (figures concerning lifespan of a typical state and federal 
criminal case); see also Smith, supra note 9, at 1328 n.35 (discussing Sir William Blackstone’s 
position that decisions are inherently retroactive). 
 11 See Kermit Roosevelt III, A Retroactivity Retrospective, With Thoughts for the Future: 
What the Supreme Court Learned from Paul Mishkin, and What it Might, 95 CAL. L. REV. 
1677, 1694 (2007) (noting that so narrow are these categories that rules are rarely found to be 
retroactive). 
 12 Id. at 126 (defining substantive constitutional rules as laws that placed “certain kinds of 
primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to 
proscribe”). 
 13 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989). 
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called an epistemologically unsound “Faustian bargain,”14 the Court created 
in Danforth an escape hatch that reflected the roots of Teague’s creation. In 
holding that states could adopt their own retroactivity standard, the Danforth 
Court recognized that when the U.S. Supreme Court adopted Teague, it did 
so in recognition of the states’ twin interests: comity and finality.15 
II. STATES SHOULD USE THE AUTHORITY CONFIRMED BY DANFORTH TO 
CREATE NEW TESTS FOR APPLYING NEW RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
RETROACTIVELY TO MEET STATE INTERESTS 
Critiques of Teague are legion.16 Less common, but still present, are 
proposed alternatives to the Teague test.17 However, even though Teague is 
a fraught test foisted on state courts to protect their own interests, few have 
seized the opportunity to adopt their own standards for determining when 
new rules will be retroactive to cases already final on direct appeal. Neither 
comity nor finality—the primary aims that justified Teague’s retreat from 
retroactivity—are persuasive reasons for a state to continue using the test. 
Moreover, when state courts adopt Teague, they unnecessarily deny 
themselves a tool to affect their state’s criminal justice jurisprudence and 
landscape. 
A. COMITY IS INAPPLICABLE TO STATES REVIEWING THEIR OWN 
STATE CONVICTIONS 
As the Supreme Court clarified, nearly two decades after announcing its 
retroactivity standard, the premise underlying Teague was the federal court’s 
limited authority to overturn final state convictions.18 This concern should 
not enter into a state’s analysis when considering which retroactivity standard 
to adopt, as the premise is inapplicable to states reviewing their own 
convictions. States have their own power to craft the laws and remedies that 
apply to their citizens, so long as those laws and remedies rise above the 
federal constitutional floor. Danforth granted the states authority to fashion 
their own retroactivity standard explicitly, because states differ in how they 
 
 14 See Lasch, supra note 7, at 5, 12. 
 15 Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 279 (2008) (citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 306). 
 16 See Lasch, supra note 7, at 6, n. 18 (collecting articles). 
 17  Some of the alternatives to Teague proposed or adopted include pipeline retroactivity. 
See, e.g., State v. Natale, 878 A.2d 724, 744 (N.J. 2005); Linkletter-Stovall test. See, People 
v. Barnes, 917 N.W.2d 577, 583 (Mich. 2018) ; liberal application of Teague. See State v. 
Mares, 335 P.3d 487, 504 (Wyo. 2014) see also Christopher M. Smith, Schriro v. Summerlin: 
A Fatal Accident of Timing, 54 DePaul L. Rev. 1325, 1362–69 (2005) (discussing retroactivity 
for death penalty cases). 
 18 Danforth, 552 U.S. at 279–81. 
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define crimes, authorize punishment, and construct rules of evidence and 
criminal procedure. “States are independent sovereigns with plenary 
authority to make and enforce their own laws as long as they do not infringe 
on federal constitutional guarantees.”19 This premise, born from notions of 
comity and federalism cannot apply to states reviewing their own state 
convictions.20 As such, the Court clarified that states were free to “provide 
remedies for a broader range of constitutional violations than are redressable 
on federal habeas.”21 One of the twin aims of Teague—comity—cannot 
justify a state’s continued allegiance.22 
Moreover, the potential for federal overreach into state convictions has 
been significantly curtailed since the passage of the Anti-Terrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). AEDPA, by instituting strict 
standards of review that federal courts must obey when considering state 
convictions, has deeply circumscribed the federal courts’ involvement in—
and power to vacate—convictions secured by the states.23 Continuing to 
employ Teague to blunt the impact of federal review cannot justify 
maintaining it. Not only does one of Teague’s aims not apply to states, but, 
as federal review becomes more impotent, Teague is arguably no longer 
necessary to protect state law convictions in federal courts. 
B. THE CONCEPT OF FINALITY SHOULD HAVE A MINIMAL ROLE IN A 
STATE COURT’S INTEREST IN RETROACTIVITY 
It has been said that “[f]inality in the criminal law is an end which must 
always be kept in plain view.”24 The Teague court called it “essential to the 
operation of our criminal justice system.”25 “Without finality, the criminal 
law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect.”26 Conceptually, this was so 
states would not have to gather their resources to relitigate a conviction after 
it was final.27 The world has changed significantly since 1989 when Teague 
was decided. Today, the resources that may be spent by a state to relitigate a 
 
 19 Id. at 280. 
 20 Id. at 279 (“Federalism and comity considerations are unique to federal habeas review 
of state convictions.”); see also Louisiana ex rel. Taylor v. Whitley, 606 So. 2d 1292, 1301 
(La. 1992) (Calogero, C.J., dissenting); Louisiana v. Gipson, 296 So. 3d 1051, 1054 (La. 
2020); Rhoades v. Idaho, 233 P.3d 61, 68 (Idaho 2010). 
 21 Danforth, 552 U.S. at 275, 277, 280–81, 288. 
 22 See also Lasch, supra note 7, at 18–19. 
 23 See Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL. L. 
REV. 443 (2007). 
 24 Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 690 (1971). 
 25 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989). 
 26 Id. at 309. 
 27 Id. 
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claim often pale in comparison to the cost of continuing to incarcerate a 
person convicted in a manner found to violate the Constitution. 
The Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates that the United States spends 
more than $80 billion each year to keep roughly 2.3 million people behind 
bars. Many experts believe that figure is a gross underestimate, though, 
because it leaves out myriad hidden costs that are often borne by prisoners 
and their loved ones, with women overwhelmingly shouldering the financial 
burden.28  These costs vary dramatically from state to state, but for many 
states retroactive application of rules may have an economic benefit to 
taxpayers and criminal justice systems. 
Stepping away from the reality that a rule granting retroactivity 
narrowly is not likely to actually conserve resources, at the heart of this rule 
is a balancing question: what are the lives of incarcerated people worth when 
balanced against the expenses of relitigating an unconstitutional conviction? 
And what does it say that, in a system where the majority of people 
incarcerated are BIPOC, our courts value conserving the cost of additional 
litigation over the lives of those incarcerated in violation of our Constitution? 
Considering that the U.S. is no stranger to spending money (and that 
providing relief through retroactivity could save money) that so many state 
courts hew to the Teague test prompts the disturbing conclusion that state 
courts prioritize maintaining rules over just results—simplicity over fairness; 
ease over complexity; white comfort over BIPOC bodies. The state courts 
prioritize the fear of too much justice over real justice for BIPOC. 
C. THERE IS NO GOOD REASON FOR STATES TO USE TEAGUE  
Given Teague’s aims and its dubious application to states deciding 
redressability of a harm occasioned by their own conviction, there remains 
little reason for states to use Teague. In adhering to Teague, states sacrifice 
their own participation in doctrinal development, an important avenue for 
criminal justice reform, and forfeit crafting retroactivity principles tailored 
to their unique needs. 
Strictly adhering to Teague restricts states’ participation in doctrinal 
development in two ways. First, as detailed by Christopher Lasch in The 
Future of Retroactivity, the first time many state courts face important 
criminal justice issues—such as ineffective assistance of counsel and 
unlawful withholding of evidence by the State—is in post-conviction 
proceedings. But in treating retroactivity as a threshold issue, state courts 
 
 28 Nicole Lewis & Beatrix Lockwood, The Hidden Costs of Incarceration, MARSHALL 
PROJECT (Dec. 17, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/12/17/the-
hidden-cost-of-incarceration [https://perma.cc/AXK7-DL5Y]. 
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often dispose of important constitutional issues without the benefit of 
rigorous debate and without issuing guidance for lower courts. In doing so, 
state courts have cut themselves out of the process of developing 
jurisprudence on these important issues.29 There is good reason for states to 
contribute to developing legal doctrine: states have different histories, face 
unique problems, and can be laboratories for creative solutions that serve 
their populations’ particular needs. States are also arguably more in tune with 
groundswells that catalyze change. But “Teague provides no incentive to the 
state courts . . . to do anything but apply current doctrine in a mindless and 
mechanical fashion.”30 
Second, in adopting Teague wholesale, states forgo grappling with the 
complex responsibility of according justice to their citizens and avoid coming 
to grips with the bargains they have struck. Instead, states take the mental 
shortcut of relying on the federal retroactivity standard instead of discerning 
a standard tailored to their unique laws and problems. Following Teague 
cripples states and defeats the very principle the Teague Court tried to 
advance. As Louisiana Supreme Court Justice Calogero pointed out in his 
dissent when Louisiana adopted Teague: “the majority’s replication of the 
United States Supreme Court’s rule in this area does not promote the goals 
of federalism; instead, in self-defeating circularity, the majority blindly 
replicates the very federal habeas rule by which the High Court attempts to 
accord comity to our state laws and decisions.”31 Sadly, after Danforth, most 
state courts considering the issue have only paid lip-service to their power to 
determine how to apply new rules to final convictions—and then left this 
authority unclaimed. Analysis of many states’ retroactivity opinions “tend 
only to the conclusion that their results are dictated less by law and reason 
than by expedient judicial administration.”32 As proof, most states have 
adopted a strict construction of Teague post-Danforth with little to no 
discussion of their unique criminal justice landscape.33 On the other hand, 
 
 29 Lasch, supra note 7, at 22–23 (2009). 
 30 Smith, supra note 9, at 1366 (2005) (quoting Tung Yin, A Better Mousetrap: 
Procedural Default as a Retroactivity Alternative to Teague v. Lane and the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 203, 242 (1998)). 
 31 Louisiana ex rel. Taylor v. Whitley, 606 So. 2d 1292, 1303 (La. 1992) (Calogero, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 32 Id. at 1296. 
 33 Alabama (see Acra v. State, 105 So. 3d 460, 466 (Ala. 2012); Ferguson v. State, 13 So. 
3d 418, 429–31 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008)); Alaska (see Charles v. State, 287 P.3d 779, 787 
(Alaska Ct. App. 2012)); Arizona (see State v. Mills, No. 2 CA-CR 2008-0200-PR, 2008 WL 
5048433, at *2 (Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2008)); Colorado (People v. Tate, 352 P.3d 959, 970–71 
(Colo. 2015 ); Connecticut (Dyous v. Comm’r of Mental Health & Addiction Servs., 151 A.3d 
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states that claim their post-Danforth authority engage in a more searching, 
state-specific inquiry, taking into account a variety of factors, considering the 
uniqueness of their state, and making independent judgements about how to 
best achieve a just result.34 States should claim their rightful place in the 
landscape of doctrinal development and chart their own path forward, taking 
into account the unique criminal justice issues faced by their state. 
 
1247, 1253 (Conn. 2016)); Idaho (Fields v. State, 234 P.3d 723, 725 (Idaho 2010)); Illinois 
(People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709, 720–21 (Ill. 2014)); Indiana (Membres v. State, 889 N.E.2d 
265, 272–73 (Ind. 2008)); Iowa (Thongvanh v. State, 938 N.W.2d 2, 11–12 (Iowa 2020)); 
Kentucky (Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151, 160 (Ky. 2009)); Massachusetts 
(Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y Suffolk Cnty., 1 N.E.3d 270, 278 (Mass. 2013)); Minnesota 
(Danforth v. State, 761 N.W.2d 493, 498 (Minn. 2009)); Mississippi (Carr v. State, 178 So. 
3d 320, 322 (Miss. 2015)); Montana (Beach v. State, 348 P.3d 629, 636 (Mont. 2015)); 
Nebraska (State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 724 (Neb. 2014)); Nevada (Ennis v. State, 137 
P.3d 1095, 1099–100 (Nev. 2006)); New Mexico (Ramirez v. State, 333 P.3d 240, 244 (N.M. 
2014)); New York (People v. Chacko, 119 A.D.3d 955, 955, 989 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014)); 
Ohio (State v. Bishop, 7 N.E.3d 605, 610 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014)); Pennsylvania 
(Commonwealth v. Washington, 142 A.3d 810, 816–17 (Pa. 2016)); South Carolina (Aiken v. 
Byars, 765 S.E.2d 572, 575 (S.C. 2014)); South Dakota (Siers v. Weber, 851 N.W.2d 731, 
742–43 (S.D. 2014)); Tennessee (Bush v. State, 428 S.W.3d 1, 20 (Tenn. 2014)); Texas (Ex 
parte De Los Reyes, 392 S.W.3d 675, 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)); Vermont (In re Barber, 
195 A.3d 364, 369 (Vt. 2018)); Washington (In re Pers. Restraint of Colbert, 380 P.3d 504, 
509 (Wash. 2016)). 
 34 See In re Brown, 259 Cal. Rptr. 3d 56, 71 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020) (the state retroactivity 
standard considers “‘(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the 
reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the 
administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.’” (quoting In re 
Lucero, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499, 505 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)); State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 
267 (Mo. 2013), overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood, 580 S.W.3d 566 (Mo. 2019) 
(stating that “the [Linkletter-Stovall] test permits [the Missouri Supreme Court] to consider 
the particular facts and legal issues relevant to the specific issue before the Court”); Verduzco 
v. State, 355 P.3d 902, 908 (Or. 2015) (acknowledging its authority post-Danforth to freely 
determine when new federal rule should be applied retroactively and noting that “[s]uch 
determinations can include a consideration of the state’s interest in the finality of convictions, 
the effect of the new federal right on the validity of the conviction, the need for predictable 
retroactivity rules, and the value of additional review”) (citation omitted); Wyoming v. Mares, 
335 P.3d 487, 503 (Wyo. 2014) (holding that “the decisions of the courts of this state whether 
to give retroactive effect to a rule of law should reflect independent judgment, based upon the 
concerns of this Court and the ‘uniqueness of our state, our Constitution, and our long-standing 
jurisprudence’”) (citation omitted); Rhoades v. State, 233 P.3d 61, 70 (Idaho 2010) (same); 
State v. Jess, 184 P.3d 133, 153 (Haw. 2008) (noting the various permutations of retroactivity 
it is permitted to apply); State v. Kennedy, 735 S.E.2d 905, 923–24 (W. Va. 2012) (adopting 
a more liberal version of Teague). 
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III. STATES SHOULD ADOPT TESTS FOR RETROACTIVITY THAT REFLECT 
THEIR UNIQUE PROBLEMS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 
As the history of how retroactivity was curtailed reveals, limiting the 
retroactive application of new judicial pronouncements had nothing to do 
with the Court’s opinion that errors of constitutional magnitude are 
committed (and that it was the Court’s job to remedy that wrong), and 
everything to do with the practical implications of according relief. As the 
Danforth Court found, “[a] decision by this Court that a new rule does not 
apply retroactively under Teague does not imply that there was no right and 
thus no violation of that right at the time of trial—only that no remedy will 
be provided in federal habeas courts.”35 States have the burden and the 
obligation to remedy the wrongs they have perpetuated. It is each state that 
will feel the burden of granting a remedy to those unconstitutionally 
convicted and imprisoned under the laws of that state.36 Each state will also 
bear the consequences of failing to grant a remedy. Thus, the decision to 
provide a remedy beyond what the United States Supreme Court will provide, 
is best left with the states, which will feel the burden, but can also claim the 
power, of remedying past wrongs. The decision of whether to afford a 
remedy to an individual whose constitutional rights were violated by the 
judicial system should result from a searching reflection of the state’s unique 
interests and values. As we have seen, the decision to grant retroactive 
application to a new rule can have a profound impact on the criminal justice 
system and has the power to embody important values. After all, the Supreme 
Court’s decision to grant retroactive effect to their decision in Atkins v. 
Virginia, which held unconstitutional the execution of the intellectually 
disabled, did more than just spare the lives of condemned men and women, 
it evidenced our nation’s advancing understanding of how the criminal 
justice system should accord dignity in punishment.37 Similarly, the Supreme 
Court’s decision banning mandatory life in prison without the possibility of 
parole for juveniles gave a future to men and women imprisoned as children, 
but it also affirmed our country’s belief that the criminal justice system could 
be an institution of redemption and hope.38 What the justice system 
communicates, both in its substantive decisions and in its choices about how 
to remedy harms, has the power to shape expectations, policy, and public 
confidence in the system. As such, each state’s retroactivity inquiry should 
embody the particular criminal justice issues faced by that state, its 
 
 35 Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 291 (2008). 
 36 Louisiana ex rel. Taylor v. Whitley, 606 So. 2d 1292, 1302 (La. 1992) (Calogero, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 37 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 38 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
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commitment to remedying past harms, and its goals for the future 
administration of justice. 
IV. JIM CROW JURIES: A LOUISIANA CASE STUDY ON THE IMPORT OF A 
STATE RETROACTIVITY STANDARD 
Louisiana is a state that should be particularly invested in its own 
decision-making regarding retroactivity because of its historic and present 
challenges with incarceration and the unique opportunity with which it is 
faced. In the 2019 term, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Ramos v. Louisiana, 
a ruling that could apply to approximately 1,600 people with final 
convictions in the State of Louisiana.39 As of this writing, the United States 
Supreme Court is considering arguments about the retroactive application of 
Ramos. Even if the Supreme Court decides not to apply Ramos retroactively, 
Louisiana’s racist past, its mammoth (mostly BIPOC) prison population, and 
its desire for reform, compel its state courts to envision a new way to decide 
retroactivity.40 
A. LOUISIANA FACES UNIQUE CHALLENGES IN ITS CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM, MANY BORN DIRECTLY FROM THE STATE’S HISTORY 
WITH SLAVERY AND THE DECADES THAT FOLLOWED 
Before the Civil War, about half of Louisiana’s population was 
enslaved41 and its prison population was predominantly white.42 After 
slavery was abolished, Louisiana lawmakers enacted discriminatory laws 
aimed at re-enslaving freed Blacks, which contributed to a demographic 
change in Louisiana prisons.43 The abolition of antebellum slavery 
 
 39 Brief of Amici Curiae the Promise of Justice Initiative, the Louisiana Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers, and the Orleans Public Defenders at 11, Edwards v. Vannoy, 140 
S. Ct. 2737 (2020) (No. 19-5807), 2020 WL 4450431. 
 40 It is possible that the U.S. Supreme Court will find that Ramos did not announce a new 
rule, while Teague only applies to “new rules.” See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1437 
(2020) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Teague applies only to a ‘new rule,’ and the positions taken by 
some in the majority may lead to the conclusion that the rule announced today is an old rule.”). 
 41 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 1860 CENSUS: POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES, (Jan. 16, 
2018), https://www.census.gov/library/publications/1864/dec/1860a.html [https://perma.cc/
WM33-KB7V]. 
 42 THOMAS AIELLO, JIM CROW’S LAST STAND: NONUNANIMOUS CRIMINAL JURY VERDICTS 
IN LOUISIANA 10 (2015); Angela A. Allen-Bell, How the Narrative About Louisiana’s Non-
Unanimous Criminal Jury System Became a Person of Interest in the Case Against Justice in 
the Deep South, 67 MERCER L. REV. 585, 594–95 (2016) (“The number of imprisoned African 
Americans increased from less than one percent before 1861 to as much as ninety percent in 
certain counties and states after 1865.”). 
 43 Michele Goodwin, The Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery, Capitalism, and Mass 
Incarceration, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 942 (2019). 
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transformed the penitentiary into a majority-Black institution, and also 
shifted the labor in Louisiana prisons from industrial to plantation work—
bestowing control over newly freed Black populations to White legislators.44 
For instance, state lawmakers passed a law that provided that “‘every adult 
freed man or woman shall furnish themselves with a comfortable home and 
visible means of support within twenty days’” after the passage of that law.45 
Black Louisianans were “immediately arrested by any sheriff or 
constable . . . and . . . hired out . . . to some citizen, being the highest bidder, 
for the remainder of the year” if they failed to find housing or employment.46 
Further contributing to this demographic shift in Louisiana prisons were local 
Black Codes such as one passed in Opelousas, Louisiana that criminalized 
any Black who came into the town of Opelousas without “special permission 
from his employer.”47 
Notably, the roughly thirty years between the Civil War and Louisiana’s 
1898 Constitutional Convention were bloody and filled with terror imposed 
upon Black Louisianans. Bloodshed often followed demands for Black 
suffrage: a right that would have granted Black Louisianans a way to oppose 
the very laws subjecting them to incarceration. This period, summarized well 
by Professor Bill Quigley, saw the creation of white terrorist organizations 
like Knights of the White Camelia and the White League, as well as 
numerous massacres perpetrated by members within their ranks:48 
In 1866, the whole nation was rocked by the New Orleans Massacre: forty-eight 
people were killed, and hundreds wounded when people gathered in an attempt to 
guarantee the right to vote to African American men. 
In 1868, as many as 250 people, mostly African American, were massacred by white 
mobs in Opelousas, Louisiana to suppress black voter turnout. Moreover, in 1868, at 
 
 44 AIELLO, supra note 42, at 10; see also Goodwin, supra note 43, at 934–35. Notably, 
there was a significant expansion of plantations in selected parishes in Louisiana—an increase 
of 286 percent between 1860 and 1880—in part tied to the change in penal labor and the 
exception to the Thirteenth Amendment; see also Nancy Virts, The Efficiency of Southern 
Tenant Plantations, 1900–1945, 51 J. ECON. HIST. 385, 387 n.7 (1991) (citing ROGER SHUGG, 
ORIGINS OF CLASS STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WHITE FARMERS AND 
LABORERS DURING SLAVERY AND AFTER, 1840–1875, 239–41 (1966)). 
 45 Goodwin, supra note 44, at 940 n.230 (quoting JAMES G. BLAINE, TWENTY YEARS OF 
CONGRESS: FROM LINCOLN TO GARFIELD 101–02 (1884)). 
 46 Id. 
 47 Ordinance by the Board of Police of Opelousas, Louisiana, as Printed in a New Orleans 
Newspaper, Freedmen and Southern Society Project (Aug. 3, 2020), http://www.freedmen.
umd.edu/Opelousas.html [https://perma.cc/JM57-74FV]. 
 48 Bill Quigley, The Continuing Significance of Race: Official Legislative Racial 
Discrimination in Louisiana 1861 to 1974, 47 S.U. L. REV. 1, 13 (2019). 
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least thirty-five, possibly more than one hundred, African Americans were murdered 
by marauding whites in St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana. 
On April 13, 1873, a white mob in Colfax, Louisiana, attacked a courthouse full of 
people defending the right to vote, set fire to the building, shot down people trying to 
flee, and, ultimately, murdered over one hundred black men. 
In 1874, white Republican elected officials in Red River Parish were killed. 
Also, in 1874, the Crescent City New Orleans White League fought against city police 
and federal troops and took control of the city and the state house. Liberty Place 
Monument was erected to honor this insurrection—an event so important to white 
citizens that, seventy-five years later, they clamored for their ancestors to be included 
in glowing tributes. 
On November 23, 1887, in Thibodeaux, Louisiana, white paramilitaries murdered sixty 
African Americans striking for better working conditions on local sugar cane 
plantations.49 
In the face of this extreme violence against Black Louisianans, and 
despite that it was most often perpetrated by white Louisianans, the 
population of prisons continued to shift from majority white to majority 
Black. After 1870, 75 percent of incarcerated persons sentenced to convict 
leasing (hard labor benefiting private entities) were Black.50 In addition to 
laws enacted to keep Black citizens enslaved, significant sentencing 
disparities in Louisiana contributed to the disproportionate number of 
incarcerated Black citizens. Take, for instance, Theophile Chevalier: 
formerly enslaved, Mr. Chevalier received a five-year sentence for stealing 
$5 on the same day a white woman received “one hour in prison” for 
manslaughter.51 That same day, a Black man was sentenced to one year in 
prison for killing a hog.52 
The lengths to which Louisiana went to keep Black Louisianans from 
acquiring full citizenship rights is no more explicit than in the 1898 Louisiana 
Constitutional Convention, explicitly gathered to counteract calls for Black 
suffrage and to enshrine “white supremacy” in the State’s legal system.53 
 
 49 Id. at 14–15 (discussing the racial historical context in which the Constitutional 
Convention was held) (emphasis added). 
 50 AIELLO, supra note 42, at 12. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Quigley, supra note 48, at 27–28 (“Judge Thomas J. Semmes, Chairman of the Judiciary 
Committee of the Convention and a former president of the American Bar Association, 
described the purpose of the Convention: ‘We (meet) here to establish the supremacy of the 
white race, and the white race constitutes the Democratic party of this State.’”) (quoting 
United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353, 371 (E.D. La. 1963); see also Quigley, supra 
note 47, at 29 (“The president of the constitutional convention is quoted as saying: ‘[w]hat 
 
46 JOHNSON & MACMATH [Vol. 111 
Everything—from the Democratic Party advertisements for the convention, 
to the opening statements at the convention—explicitly called for a renewed 
oppression of Black Louisianans.54 All delegates to the Constitutional 
Convention were white.55 The official journal stated: “Our mission was, in 
the first place, to establish the supremacy of the white race in this State to the 
extent to which it could be legally and constitutionally done.”56 
The agenda for the convention was Black suffrage, the criminal system, 
and public education.57 At the conclusion, the Governor addressed the 
legislature, stating: 
The white supremacy for which we have so long struggled at the cost of so much 
precious blood and treasure, is now crystallized into the Constitution as a fundamental 
part and parcel of that organic instrument, and that, too, by no subterfuge or other 
evasions. With this great principle thus firmly imbedded in the Constitution, and 
honestly enforced, there need be no longer any fear as to the honesty and purity of our 
future elections.58 
The Governor’s prediction rang true. While there were 130,000 
registered Black voters at the time of the 1898 Constitutional Convention, by 
1922, that number had dramatically dropped to only 598 registered voters 
because of voting restrictions put in place during the convention.59 The 1898 
Constitutional Convention reinstated mandatory segregation of schools.60 It 
allowed for sentence enhancements for multiple convictions, such as double 
or triple time or life for multiple offenses.61 And finally, the convention 
 
care I whether the test that we have put be a new one or an old one? What care I whether it be 
more or less ridiculous or not? Doesn’t it meet the case? Doesn’t it let the white man vote, and 
doesn’t it stop the negro from voting, and isn’t that what we came here for?’”) (quoting Debo 
P. Adegible, Voting Rights in Louisiana, 1982–2006, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 413, 
416–17 (2008)). 
 54 Thomas Ward Frampton, The Jim Crow Jury, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1593, 1612 (2018) 
(noting that the purpose of the Convention was to eliminate “‘the vast mass of ignorant, 
illiterate and venal negroes from the privileges of the elective franchise . . . .’”) (quoting The 
Following Resolutions, DAILY PICAYUNE, 9 (Jan. 4, 1898)); OFF. J. OF THE PROC. OF THE 
CONST. CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 381 (H. Hearsey ed. 1898) (quoting the 
opening address’s call “to eliminate from the electorate the mass of corrupt and illiterate voters 
who have during the last quarter of century degraded a politics” and to perpetuate “the 
supremacy of the Anglo-Saxon race in Louisiana”). 
 55 Allen-Bell, supra note 42, at 596. 
 56 OFF. J. OF THE PROC. OF THE CONST. CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 375 (H. 
Hearsey ed. 1898). 
 57 Allen-Bell, supra note 42, at 596. 
 58 United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353, 374 (E.D. La. 1963), aff’d sub nom, 
Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965) (quoting La. Senate J. 1898, 33–35). 
 59 AIELLO, supra note 42, at 23. 
 60 La. Const. Ann. art. 248 (1898). 
 61 State v. Kierson, 72 So. 799, 799–800 (La. 1916). 
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sought to nullify the voices of Black jurors. As explained by Justice Gorsuch 
in Ramos: 
Just a week before the convention, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution calling for an 
investigation into whether Louisiana was systemically excluding African-Americans 
from juries. Seeking to avoid unwanted national attention, and aware that this Court 
would strike down any policy of overt discrimination against African-American jurors 
as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the delegates sought to undermine 
African-American participation on juries in another way. With a careful eye on racial 
demographics, the convention delegates sculpted a “facially race-neutral” rule 
permitting 10-to-2 verdicts in order “to ensure that African-American juror service 
would be meaningless.”62 
Louisiana remained the only state to permit non-unanimous jury 
verdicts for non-petty convictions until 1934, when Oregon adopted a 
comparable law. 
As the years passed, not only did non-unanimous jury verdicts silence 
the voices of Black jurors in criminal matters, but they also disproportionally 
affected Black defendants.63 As Justice Kavanaugh explained in his 
concurrence: “In light of the racist origins of the non-unanimous jury, it is no 
surprise that non-unanimous juries can make a difference in practice, 
especially in cases involving Black defendants, victims, or jurors. After all, 
that was the whole point of adopting the non-unanimous jury requirement in 
the first place.”64 
Today, Louisiana has the highest incarceration rate in the United States. 
It leads the nation in life without the possibility of parole sentences. 65 As of 
June 30, 2020, 4,596 people in Louisiana were serving such sentences.66 
 
 62 Ramos v. Louisiana 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1394 (2020) (quoting State v. Maxie, No. 13-CRR-
72522 (La. 11th Jud. Dist., Oct. 11, 2018)). 
 63 Jeff Adelson, Gordon Russell & John Simerman, How an Abnormal Louisiana Law 
Deprives, Discriminates and Drives Incarceration: Tilting the Scales, ADVOCATE (Apr. 1, 
2018, 8:05 AM), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/courts/article_16fd0ece-3
2b1-11e8-8770-33eca2a325de.html [https://perma.cc/S7H7-95LF]. 
 64 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1417–18 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“silenc[ing] the voices and 
negat[ing] the votes of black jurors” would be particularly impactful “in cases with black 
defendants . . . .”). 
 65 Lea Skene, Louisiana’s Life Without Parole sentencing the Nation’s Highest—and 
Some Say That Should Change, ADVOCATE (Dec. 7, 2019, 4:59 PM), https://www.theadvoca
te.com/baton_rouge/news/article_f6309822-17ac-11ea-8750-f7d212aa28f8.html 
[https://perma.cc/HYR8-PHNR]. 
 66 John Bel Edwards & James M. Le Blanc, Louisiana Corrections: Briefing Book 28 (July 
2020), https://s32082.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Full-BB-Jul-20.pdf [https://perm
a.cc/QTR2-TRUB]; TCR Staff, Louisiana Leads Nation in Life Without Parole Terms, CRIME 
REPORT (Dec. 12, 2019), https://thecrimereport.org/2019/12/12/louisiana-leads-nation-in-life-
without-parole-terms [https://perma.cc/G3PL-8SDK] (“About 15 percent of Louisiana’s 
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Louisiana has more inmates serving life without parole than Texas, Arkansas, 
Mississippi, Alabama and Tennessee combined.67 By contrast, fewer than 70 
people in United Kingdom are in prison with life without the possibility of 
parole sentences.68 In Louisiana, almost one in five of the people serving 
these life without the possibility of parole sentences, received such a sentence 
because of a non-unanimous jury verdict,69 ratified by that 1898 
Constitutional Convention. 
Incarcerating the most residents per capita than any other place in the 
word comes at a cost: Louisiana spends nearly $600 million dollars each year 
on its prison system.70 Louisiana must grapple with its racist foundations and 
the real harm that these laws and practices have caused BIPOCs. Adopting a 
state-specific standard that accords a remedy to those incarcerated because 
of an unconstitutional and racist law provides an undeniable example of the 
power state courts can have to change the criminal justice landscape of their 
state by deeming “new” constitutional commands more broadly retroactive 
than they would be under federal law. 
B. RAMOS V. LOUISIANA AS AN EXAMPLE OF A CASE THAT, 
REGARDLESS OF TEAGUE, SHOULD BE RETROACTIVE UNDER THE 
INTERESTS OF LOUISIANA. 
In the 1970s, cases from both Louisiana and Oregon went to the U.S. 
Supreme Court seeking to end non-unanimous jury convictions. In Apodaca 
v. Oregon71 and Johnson v. Louisiana,72 the Court considered whether non-
unanimous juries violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The result 
was a tangle of seven separate opinions. Five Justices adhered to the Court’s 
 
prison population consists of people serving life without parole, the highest percentage among 
all states.”). 
 67 TCR Staff, supra note 66. 
 68 U.K. Ministry of Justice, Offender Management Statistics Bulletin (Oct. 31, 2019), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_dat
a/file/842590/OMSQ_2019_Q2.pdf#page=3 [https://perma.cc/YH6N-6B9S]. 
 69 Brief of Amici Curiae the Promise of Justice Initiative, the Louisiana Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers, and the Orleans Public Defenders at 26, Edwards v. Vannoy, 140 
S. Ct. 2737 (2020) (No.19-5807), 2020 WL 4450431. 
 70 Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections – Corrections Services, 
Proposed Budget Supporting Document [FY 2019-2020], 2 https://www.doa.la.gov/opb/pub/
FY20/SupportingDocument/08A_Corrections_Services.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q94Q-L2AW]. 
 71 Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972). 
 72 Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972). 
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prior decisions holding that the Sixth Amendment requires unanimity.73 Four 
of those five Justices also concluded that the incorporation doctrine required 
the states to abide by the Sixth Amendment’s unanimity requirement.74 No 
other outcome, the Justices explained, was available under the Court’s 
Fourteenth Amendment precedent, which established that “once it is decided 
that a particular Bill of Rights guarantee [applies to the states], . . . the same 
constitutional standards apply against both the State and Federal 
Governments.”75 Yet Justice Powell refused to follow this precedent.76 
Instead, he cast his deciding vote based on his belief that “due process does 
not require that the States apply the federal jury-trial right with all its gloss.”77 
His vote combined with the plurality opinion of Justice White, which 
suggested that the jury trial clause should turn on the “function served by the 
jury in contemporary society,”78 to uphold the practice of allowing criminal 
convictions where some jurors disagreed with the verdict.79 As this Court 
later put it, Apodaca “held that although the Sixth Amendment right to trial 
by jury requires a unanimous jury verdict in federal criminal trials, it does 
not require a unanimous jury verdict in state criminal trials.”80 
In the years following Apodaca, Louisiana amended—and subsequently 
abandoned—its non-unanimity rule. In 1973, the State amended its 
Constitution to require ten, instead of nine, out of twelve jurors to concur in 
a guilty verdict.81 Then, in 2015, historian Thomas Aiello published Jim 
Crow’s Last Stand, in which he described the non-unanimity rule as the last 
remnant of the racist “redeemer” agenda in the Louisiana legal system. The 
largest newspaper in Louisiana, The Advocate, also ran a series of pieces 
 
 73 See id. at 371 (Powell, J., concurring in Johnson and concurring in the judgment in 
Apodaca). See also Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 414 (Stewart, J., joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ., 
dissenting); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 380, 381–83 (Douglas, J., dissenting in Johnson 
and Apodaca). 
 74 Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 414–15 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Johnson, 406 U.S. at 380 
(Douglas, J., dissenting in Johnson and Apodaca). 
 75 Johnson, 406 U.S. at 385 (Douglas, J., dissenting in Johnson and Apodaca) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 76 Johnson, 406 at 369–71 (Powell, J., concurring in Johnson and concurring in the 
judgment in Apodaca). 
 77 Id. at 371. 
 78 Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 410. 
 79 Id. at 406, 406 n.1; Johnson, 406 U.S. at 366 (Powell, J., concurring in Johnson and 
concurring in the judgment in Apodaca). 
 80 McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 766 n.14 (2010); see also Johnson, 406 U.S. 
at 383 (Douglas, J., dissenting in Johnson and Apodaca) (explaining the holding of Apodaca 
the same way at the time). 
 81 See La. Const. Ann. art. 1, § 17(A) (1974); see also La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 
782(A) (1974). 
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examining the non-unanimity rule’s operation and effects. The series, which 
won a Pulitzer Prize, included an empirical analysis revealing that Black 
defendants were significantly more likely than white defendants to be 
convicted by non-unanimous verdicts.82 This groundswell culminated in 
2018, when the people of Louisiana voted to repeal the State’s non-unanimity 
rule and replace it with a law requiring unanimous jury verdicts in every 
felony trial. However, the new law applied only prospectively to crimes 
committed on or after January 1, 2019.83 It did not apply to cases arising from 
crimes occurring before that date, even if the cases have not yet gone to trial. 
Until April 20, 2020, people tried in Louisiana were still tried by juries who 
knew that their vote did not need to be unanimous. 
Mr. Evangelisto Ramos’s case was on direct review when the people of 
Louisiana amended the Louisiana Constitution in 2018. A grand jury charged 
Mr. Ramos with a single count of second-degree murder.84 Mr. Ramos 
maintained his innocence and insisted on a trial. The State’s case against Mr. 
Ramos was rooted in circumstantial evidence.85 The State stressed that 
witnesses saw Mr. Ramos with the victim the day before her death and that 
he had admitted he had touched the garbage can in which her body was 
found.86 But the State presented no eyewitness or physical evidence directly 
linking Mr. Ramos to the killing.87 Even though police officers had 
thoroughly searched Mr. Ramos’s home (where, under the prosecution’s 
theory, the violent crime would presumably have taken place), the police 
found no murder weapon, blood from the victim, or any trace of physical 
evidence. Instead, the State relied on suppositions and innuendo. For 
example, the lead detective testified that other local residents had told him 
the stabbing must have been committed by a “Mexican or Hispanic” 
individual, because “they like to use knives.”88 
The jury was divided after about two hours of deliberation. Two jurors 
believed the prosecution had failed to prove Mr. Ramos guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt while ten jurors thought the State had proven its case 
against Mr. Ramos.89 Under Louisiana’s then-applicable non-unanimity law, 
that was enough for a conviction.90 The jury stopped deliberating and 
 
 82 Adelson, Russell & Simerman, supra note 63 [https://perma.cc/S7H7-95LF]. 
 83 See 2018 La. Reg. Sess., Act 722. 
 84 State v. Ramos, 231 So. 3d 44, 46 (La. Ct. App. 2017). 
 85 Id. at 50. 
 86 Id. at 48. 
 87 Id. at 50. 
 88 Id. at 48. 
 89 Id. at 46. 
 90 Id. at 53. 
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delivered its verdict.91 In 2016, the court sentenced Mr. Ramos to life in 
prison without the possibility of parole—the mandatory sentence for second-
degree murder—and in March 2019 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
decide whether the Constitution permits a state to convict someone of a crime 
by a non-unanimous jury verdict.92 On April 20, 2020, the Supreme Court 
reversed Mr. Ramos’s conviction, holding that the Sixth Amendment’s Jury 
Trial Clause requires unanimity,93 and that this requirement applies to states 
via the Fourteenth Amendment.94 In this monumental decision, the Court 
recognized the law’s racist roots, Louisiana’s desire to reconcile that past as 
demonstrated in the passage of the 2018 bill, and the need to give relief to 
those harmed by the bill. It stopped short, however, of declaring the new rule 
retroactive, a choice that the Court is currently confronting. When it does, the 
Court will be bound to apply Teague, or else overrule it in favor of a different 
model. 
But the same concerns that led the Court to declare a unanimous jury a 
constitutional right are the concerns that militate in favor of granting 
retroactive relief to the one in five incarcerated Louisianans serving life in 
prison without the possibility of parole. As firmly and clearly stated by the 
Chief Justice of Louisiana’s Supreme Court: “If concerns of comity and 
federalism ultimately mean that the federal courts do not force us to remedy 
those convictions which are already final through a writ of habeas corpus, the 
moral and ethical obligation upon courts of this state to address the racial 
stain of our own history is even more compelling, not less.”95 Ramos and the 
Louisiana state courts are positioned to provide a model for how states should 
approach retroactivity post-Danforth. As Louisiana’s Chief Justice further 
noted: 
The importance of the Ramos decision—and the historic symbolism of the law that it 
struck—present the opportunity to reassess Taylor and the wisdom of Louisiana using 
the Teague standard in retroactivity analysis. We should. The original purpose of the 
non-unanimous jury law, its continued use, and the disproportionate and detrimental 
impact it has had on African American citizens for 120 years is Louisiana’s history. 
The recent campaign to end the use of the law is already part of the history of this state’s 
long and ongoing struggle for racial justice and equal rights for all Louisianans. That 
campaign meant many more citizens now understand the law’s origins, purpose, and 
discriminatory impact. And that understanding contributes to a cynicism and fatal 
mistrust of Louisiana’s criminal justice system by many citizens who see the lack of 
fundamental fairness and equal protection afforded to all. It is time that our state 
 
 91 Id. at 46. 
 92 Ramos v. Louisiana, 139 S. Ct. 1318 (2019). 
 93 Ramos v. Louisiana, 139 S. Ct. 1390 (2020). 
 94 Id. 
 95 State v. Gipson, 296 So. 3d 1051, 1056 (La. 2020) (Johnson, C.J. dissenting). 
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courts—not the United States Supreme Court—decided whether we should address the 
damage done by our longtime use of an invidious law. 
The racist history of the law was not explicitly relevant to the Supreme Court’s 
determination that the Sixth Amendment requires jury unanimity. However, a majority 
of the justices considered that history as one of the principled justifications for 
abandoning stare decisis and departing from the “gravely mistaken” and “egregiously 
wrong” “outlier” precedent of Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 92 S. Ct. 1628, 32 L. 
Ed. 2d 184 (1972) (in which a plurality of the Supreme Court held that Oregon and 
Louisiana’s non-unanimous jury schemes did not violate the Sixth Amendment) in 
favor of a correct interpretation of the Sixth Amendment’s jury requirement. Ramos, 
140 S. Ct. at 1405, 1418. That history should be just as—if not more—persuasive to us 
in deciding whether to overrule the erroneously reasoned Taylor case. I am persuaded 
that we should, and that we should replace Teague’s test with one that, at least in part, 
weighs the discriminatory effects of a stricken law when determining retroactive 
applicability in Louisiana.96 
May the opportunity presenting Louisiana be a reminder of the role state 
courts can play in shaping their criminal justice system and a clarion call to 
re-claim the power they have abandoned. 
CONCLUSION 
On what ground would anyone have us leave Mr. Ramos in prison for the rest of his 
life? Not a single Member of this Court is prepared to say Louisiana secured his 
conviction constitutionally under the Sixth Amendment. No one before us suggests that 
the error was harmless. Louisiana does not claim precedent commands an affirmance. 
In the end, the best anyone can seem to muster against Mr. Ramos is that, if we dared 
to admit in his case what we all know to be true about the Sixth Amendment, we might 
have to say the same in some others. But where is the justice in that? Every judge must 
learn to live with the fact he or she will make some mistakes; it comes with the territory. 
But it is something else entirely to perpetuate something we all know to be wrong only 
because we fear the consequences of being right. 
– Justice Neal Gorsuch97 
The burden of the inequity of the country’s criminal justice system has, 
for too long, been born by our incarcerated population—disproportionately 
composed of people of color. By way of example, while approximately 32 
percent of Louisiana’s population is Black, 69.9 percent of prisoners 
incarcerated for felony convictions are Black.98 
Unsurprisingly, as recent events have revealed, this has caused marked 
distrust and disillusionment with Louisiana’s criminal justice system, 
particularly for the state’s Black residents, for whom the connection between 
the criminal justice system and Louisiana’s racist past is all too clear. This 
 
 96 Id. at 1055. 
 97 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1408. 
 98 Gipson, 296 So. 3d at 1053. 
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moment is a time to begin shifting the costs of this unfair judicial system 
from our incarcerated population to the system that harmed them.  
Let us start by telling those whom our system has harmed, and whose 
harm is declared constitutionally intolerable by the Court, that we will no 
longer deny them a remedy. Let us enact a retroactivity test that considers 
our own racialized past, our overcrowded prisons, our desire to repair, and 
our hope for a more just and equitable future. It is time to repair wounds 
inflicted by centuries of bad policy fueled by institutional racism, social 
inequity, fear, and politics. Each state must, for itself, decide whether the 
ideals that define its system of justice can bear the failure to accord a remedy 
to those convicted in violation of the Constitution. If each state performs this 
self-inquiry in earnest, the answer will be that the system cannot bear it; that 
the consequence of leaving unaddressed a system that has buckled under 
decades of injustice is more calamitous than the inconvenience of too much 
justice. 
 
